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_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 In this interlocutory appeal, the Government 
contests the District Court’s order directing the immediate 
release of twenty immigration detainees because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.2  Before we may even consider the 
merits of the Government’s appeal, we must of course 
determine that we have appellate jurisdiction.  By order 
entered April 15, 2020, we notified the parties that 
jurisdiction exists.  We now provide the reasons for that 
determination. 
I. 
 On April 3, 2020, a diverse group of twenty 
immigration detainees3 housed at York County Prison 
(York) and Pike County Correctional Facility (Pike) filed 
the underlying habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  The petitioners sought immediate release, 
 
2 COVID-19 is a highly contagious respiratory virus that 
poses unique risks in population-dense facilities.  United 
States v. Raia, No. 20-1033, 2020 WL 1647922, at *1 (3d 
Cir. Apr. 8, 2020). 
3 Initially, there were twenty-two petitioners, but two were 
released by agreement with the Government. 
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claiming that due to various underlying health conditions, 
their continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic 
puts them at imminent risk of death or serious injury and 
thereby violates their constitutional rights.  Concurrently 
with the petition, the petitioners filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) directing their 
immediate release.   
The District Court responded quickly, concluding 
that the petitioners face irreparable harm and are likely to 
succeed on the merits, see Mem. and Order 6–11 (Apr. 7, 
2020), ECF No. 11, that the Government would “face very 
little potential harm from Petitioner’s [sic] immediate 
release,” and that “the public interest strongly encourages 
Petitioners’ release,” id. at 12.  The District Court did not 
even wait for a response from the Government.  It granted 
the TRO, directed that Petitioners be released immediately 
on their own recognizance, and set the TRO to expire on 
April 20, 2020 at 5:00 p.m.  The District Court also 
required that, no later than noon on April 13, 2020, the 
Government was to show cause why the TRO should not 
be converted to a preliminary injunction. 
The same day the TRO issued, the Government 
moved for reconsideration and stay of the TRO.  It 
signaled that it had substantial legal arguments to present 
in opposition, concerning both the petitioners’ likelihood 
of success on the merits and the likelihood of irreparable 
harm.  See Mot. Recons. 2.  In addition, the Government 
provided a declaration describing conditions at York and 
Pike along with details of the petitioners’ criminal 
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histories.  Still later that day, the District Court granted the 
Government’s motion for reconsideration, stayed its own 
order, and directed the petitioners to respond.  They did so 
promptly.  The Government also quickly filed a response 
opposing the habeas petition and the TRO. 
 On Friday, April 10, 2020, the District Court denied 
reconsideration on grounds that the Government had failed 
to demonstrate a change in controlling law, provide 
previously unavailable evidence, or show a clear error of 
law or the need to prevent manifest injustice.4  It therefore 
lifted the stay and again ordered the Government to 
immediately release the petitioners, this time extending 
the release period “until such time as the COVID-19 state 
of emergency as declared by the Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is lifted, or by further 
Order of this Court.”  Order 5 (Apr. 10, 2020), ECF No. 
22.  But the District Court’s order also stated that “the 
TRO expires on April 20, 2020 at 5:00 p.m.”  Id. at 6.  And, 
in an apparent attempt to allay some of the concerns 
expressed in the Government’s submissions, the District 
Court attached conditions to the petitioners’ release, 
including, among others, that the order “expires 
immediately if a Petitioner absconds,” a requirement that 
“Petitioners shall report their whereabouts once per week 
to their attorneys, who in turn shall report to the 
Respondents if a Petitioner has absconded,” a mandate to 
 
4 The District Court gave no indication that it had 
considered the Government’s response to the habeas 
petition.  See Order 1 (Apr. 10, 2020), ECF No. 22. 
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appear at all removal hearings and to comply with certain 
final deportation orders, and an allowance that the 
Government may “tak[e] Petitioners back into custody 
should they commit any further crimes or otherwise 
violate the terms of their release.”  Id. at 5–6.  
The Government immediately appealed from the 
District Court’s April 7 and April 10 orders.  It 
simultaneously moved the District Court to stay the 
petitioners’ release, and the District Court summarily 
denied the stay request.  In response, the Government 
sought a temporary administrative stay from this Court, 
which we granted within hours of the request.  Although 
the District Court lifted its April 7 stay the same day we 
granted a temporary administrative stay, the Government 
reports that, in the brief period between the two orders, 
nineteen of the twenty petitioners were released, and none 
have been re-detained.5  See Gov’t Emer. Mot. Stay 11. 
 
5 The release of the majority of the petitioners does not 
undermine our jurisdiction.  For purposes of jurisdiction 
over an immigration-related habeas corpus claim, a 
petitioner must be in the “custody” of the federal 
immigration agency at the time the petition is filed. 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); 
Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 
2006).  “Custody” includes incarceration.  Id.  A 
subsequent release from incarceration does not divest this 
Court of jurisdiction.  Id. at 173 n.7; see also Chafin v. 
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II. 
 Typically, an interlocutory order granting or 
denying a TRO is not immediately appealable.  
Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 692 
(3d Cir. 1997).  A TRO is not an appealable “final 
decision[]” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Morton Int’l, Inc. 
v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470, 476 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(a “final decision” generally is one that ends the litigation 
on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment).6  Although a TRO is a form of 
injunctive relief, and injunctions are ordinarily appealable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a),7 an order granting a TRO 
generally is not considered an appealable injunction for 
practical reasons:  “temporary restraining orders are of 
short duration and terminate with a ruling on the 
preliminary injunction, making an immediate appeal 
 
Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172–73 (2013) (case is not moot 
where it is possible to grant relief to the prevailing party). 
6 But see, e.g., Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026, 
1030 (4th Cir. 1976) (concluding that the practical effect 
of the TRO in question, which granted the plaintiff all the 
relief it sought, made the order a final decision appealable 
under § 1291). 
7 Section 1292(a)(1) provides in relevant part: “the courts 
of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from 
[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United 
States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or 
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify 
injunctions.” 
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unnecessary to protect the rights of the parties.”  
Nutrasweet, 112 F.3d at 692 (citing Vuitton v. White, 945 
F.2d 569, 573 (3d Cir. 1991)).   
Here, the District Court’s orders purport to be 
TROs.  But the unfolding global pandemic and health 
crisis with which the orders grapple are—as the District 
Court itself acknowledges, see Mem. and Order 6 (Apr. 7, 
2020), ECF No. 11—anything but typical.  We must 
carefully assess, given the nature of this TRO and the 
unusual circumstances from which it arises, whether an 
immediate appeal is necessary to protect the rights of the 
parties.8  See Nutrasweet, 112 F.3d at 692–93.   
A. 
We begin by considering the characteristics that 
distinguish a non-appealable TRO from an appealable 
preliminary injunction.  Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure differentiates between the two.  A 
preliminary injunction must be issued with notice to the 
adverse party.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).  A TRO, in 
contrast, may be issued without notice where it is “clearly 
show[n] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party 
can be heard in opposition.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).  
 
8 The parties were directed to file responses on the issue of 
appellate jurisdiction.  We have considered these 
submissions in reaching our determination, and we 
commend counsel for their promptness and diligence.   
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Absent good cause or consent, such an order must expire 
within fourteen days.  Fed. R. Civ. 65(b)(2).   
As the Supreme Court has observed, “our entire 
jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action 
taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be 
heard has been granted [to] both sides of a dispute.”  
Granny Goose Foods Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 
423, 439 (1974).  Accordingly, while TROs may be 
appropriate at times, they must be circumscribed in nature.   
Importantly, TROs are ordinarily aimed at 
temporarily preserving the status quo.  “[U]nder federal 
law [TROs] should be restricted to serving their 
underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and 
preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to 
hold a hearing, and no longer.”  Id.; see also J.O. ex rel. 
C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 273 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (concluding that interim relief preserving the 
status quo is not merit-based and acknowledging a TRO as 
a “stay put[] equitable remedy that has as its essential 
purpose the preservation of the status quo while the merits 
of the cause are explored through litigation” (quoting 
Foreman v. Dall. Cty., 193 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 1999), 
abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 
207 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted))); 
Christopher P. ex rel. Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 
805 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he procurement of a TRO in which 
the court does not address the merits of the case but simply 
preserves the status quo to avoid irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to give a plaintiff 
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prevailing party status.”); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sunstrand 
Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The function 
of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo 
pending a determination of the action on the merits.” 
(citation omitted)).   
Where, by contrast, a purported TRO goes beyond 
preservation of the status quo and mandates affirmative 
relief, the order may be immediately appealable under 
§ 1292(a)(1).  See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Am. Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps., 473 U.S. 1301, 1304–05 (1985) (observing 
that “[o]nly if the District Court granted the temporary 
restraining order would it have disturbed the status quo” 
by preventing the implementation of new regulations, 
thereby implying that appellate jurisdiction would have 
been available in that circumstance); Tanner Motor 
Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808–09 (9th Cir. 
1963) (in a TRO proceeding, “it is not usually proper to 
grant the moving party the full relief to which he might be 
entitled if successful at the conclusion of a trial . . . [t]his 
is particularly true where the relief afforded, rather than 
preserving the status quo, completely changes it”); see 
also Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(purported TRO was “essentially affirmative” and thus, 
despite its short duration, was an appealable mandatory 
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).   
The case for immediate appealability is even 
stronger where the effects of the purported TRO are 
substantial and potentially irreversible.  An order may be 
appealed under § 1292(a)(1) if it has the “practical effect” 
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of an injunction and “further[s] the statutory purpose of 
‘permit[ting] litigants to effectually challenge 
interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, 
consequence.’” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 
84 (1981) (quoting Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 
348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)).  Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded 
that an order purporting to be a TRO but requiring a 
government official to affirmatively engage in 
“unprecedented” mandatory action with “potent” and 
“irretrievable” diplomatic and environmental impact was 
an immediately appealable injunction under § 1292(a)(1).  
Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  
Several other courts of appeals stated they have 
jurisdiction to review a purported TRO if it “might have a 
serious, perhaps irreparable consequence and can be 
effectually challenged only by immediate appeal.”  Ross 
v. Rell, 398 F.3d 203, 204 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Romer 
v. Green Point Savings Bank, 27 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(cleaned up)); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 
F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a grant or 
denial of a TRO might have a serious, perhaps irreparable, 
consequence, and can be effectually challenged only by 
immediate appeal, we may exercise appellate 
jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); see also Ne. Ohio Coal. 
v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1005–06 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(collecting cases). 
Thus, we look to the purpose and effect of a 
purported TRO to determine whether it may be appealed 
under § 1292(a)(1). 
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B. 
  With these principles in mind, we consider the 
District Court’s orders.  Although the District Court 
characterized its orders as TROs, we are plainly not bound 
by that choice of classification.  When evaluating whether 
an order is an appealable injunction, we must look past 
labels to consider functional effects.  See Ramara, Inc. v. 
Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 669–70 (3d Cir. 2016).  
What matters “is what the court actually did, not what it 
said it did.”  Id. at 669 (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 
U.S. 61, 86–87 (1974)); see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 
F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010) (reviewing TRO as a 
preliminary injunction because it was of indefinite 
duration and entered after both notice and an adversarial 
hearing); In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 
F.2d 1150, 1155 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that when 
deciding jurisdiction, a reviewing court will look beyond 
“terminology to the actual content, purport, and effect of 
that which may . . . be described as a temporary restraining 
order or as a preliminary restraining order” (citation 
omitted)).   
 Because the District Court proceeded without 
affording the Government an opportunity to be heard, it 
purported to enter a TRO.9  But its relief altered the status 
 
9 Significantly, the District Court considered the 
Government’s position only in deciding the motion to 
reconsider the April 7 order.  But in that procedural 
context, the District Court confined the Government to the 
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quo, exceeding the temporary and limited nature of a TRO.  
See Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 439.  By directing the 
release of the twenty petitioners on their own 
recognizance, the District Court ordered mandatory, 
affirmative relief—indeed, the ultimate relief sought by 
the petitioners in their underlying habeas petition.  The 
grant of affirmative relief is a strong indicator that the 
District Court’s orders are immediately appealable under 
§ 1292(a)(1).  See Ramara, 814 F.3d at 672 (grant of 
ultimate relief is a factor in determining that an order is 
appealable under § 1292(a)(1)); Tanner, 316 F.2d at 808–
09; Adams, 570 F.2d at 953; Belknap, 427 F.2d at 498. 
 Moreover, there is a substantial possibility that the 
petitioners’ release will result—if it has not already—in 
serious and potentially irreversible consequences. That 
makes immediate appellate review both necessary and 
appropriate to protect the rights of the parties.  See 
Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225; Ross, 398 F.3d at 204; Adams, 
570 F.2d at 953.  The Government argues that many 
petitioners are a flight risk, a danger to the community 
 
limited grounds for reconsideration (i.e., requiring it to 
demonstrate a change in controlling law, provide 
previously unavailable evidence, or show a clear error of 
law or the need to prevent manifest injustice).  See Order 
2 (April 10, 2020), ECF 22 (citing Max’s Seafood Café ex 
rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  Although the Government filed a substantive 
opposition to the TRO request, the record does not reflect 
that the District Court ever considered it.    
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based on their individual criminal histories, and subject to 
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  See Gov’t 
Mot. Stay Pending Appeal 17–19.  Additionally, although 
the District Court’s orders purport to be of limited 
duration, the District Court’s April 10 order directs the 
petitioners’ release “until such time as the COVID-19 state 
of emergency as declared by the Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is lifted, or by further 
Order of this Court.”  Order at 5 (Apr. 10, 2020), ECF No. 
22.  The order therefore can be read as having an indefinite 
duration and does not necessarily comply with the 
fourteen-day limitation in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).  
Moreover, the orders do not mention the possibility of re-
detention upon expiration of the purported TRO period, 
and they include no consideration of the practical 
difficulties involved in locating and re-detaining the 
petitioners should that become necessary.  A delayed 
appeal would increase the prospect that the effects of the 
District Court’s order will last beyond the purported 
expiration of the TRO and, indeed, may potentially yield 
consequences that cannot be undone. 
III. 
 In sum, the District Court’s orders affirmatively 
directing the immediate release of twenty immigration 
detainees will not evade our prompt appellate review 
simply by virtue of the District Court’s invocation of the 
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label “TRO.”10  An immediate appeal is necessary to 
protect the rights of the parties.  See Nutrasweet, 112 F.3d 
at 692.  For the reasons we have discussed, we have 
appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) and will proceed 
to consider the appeal on the merits.11 
 
10 Because we have determined that jurisdiction exists 
under § 1292(a)(1), we need not address the Government’s 
alternative suggestion to proceed under the All Writs Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
11 This opinion is limited to the issue of appellate 
jurisdiction.  Having concluded that jurisdiction exists, we 
will separately consider the merits after the parties have 
had the opportunity to brief the issues presented. 
 
